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T HE General Assembly amended the Colorado Election Code in
1963 to provide that:
Within ninety days following the general election,['] the county
clerk shall furnish to the county chairmen of the two major political
parties[21 a list containing the names, addresses, precinct numbers
and party affiliations of the electors[3l whose names were removed[
4
from the registration book["] for failure to vote at the last preceding
general election.
8
Although the legislature has the power to enact reasonable reg-
ulations regarding registration of voters when such regulations do
not violate constitutional provisions of the state7 or of the United
1 The term general election is defined as "the election held on the Tuesday succeeding
the first Monday of November in each even numbered year." COLO. Riv. STAT.
§ 49-1-4(1) (1963).
2 A major political party is defined as "one of the two political parties whose candi-
dates for governor at the last preceding gubernatorial election received the first and
second greatest number of votes." CoLo. REv. STAT. § 49-1-4(13) (1963). Query
whether this is a just classification, in that any political party might number the
greatest percentage of electors and yet not have even run a gubernatorial candidate.
3 An elector is one "who is legally qualified to register to vote in this state." COLO.
REV. STAT. § 49-1-4(4) (1963).
4 Purging the registration book is required by COLO. REv. STAT. § 49-4-21(1) (1963).
5 A registration book contains the identification and registration information pertaining
to individual electors. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 49-1-4(21), '(22) (1963).
6 COLO. REV. STAT. § 49-4-21(3) (1963) (emphasis and footnotes added). See also
COLO. REV. STAT. § 49-4-21(4) (1963), which required similar action before the
primary election in 1964.
7 Harrell v. Sullivan, 220 Ind. 108, 40 N.E.2d 115 (1942), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Marion Cir. Ct., 225 Ind. 7, 72 N.E.2d 225 (1947). As to the
problem of concern here, Harrell is closely analogous on one point of its four alter-
native holdings. Harrell holds that:
The requirement that registration boards . . . shall supply the county
chairmen of the two major political parties with copies of registration
memoranda is likewise invalid for two reasons. It is bad for classification
since . . . it grants privileges to the members of two political parties which,
upon the same terms, do not equally belong to all.
Id. at 124, 40 N.E.2d at 121.
The broad language in Marion Cir. Ct. overruling Harrell "in all things" has not
been followed in Indiana or elsewhere. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 599 (S. D.
Tex. 1950); State v. Millspaugh, 241 Ind. 656, 659, 175 N.E.2d 13, 15 (1961);
Indiana Dep't of Rev. v. Callaway's Estate, 232 Ind. 1, 5, 110 N.E.2d 903, 905
(1953). Apparently the Marion Cir. Ct. holding is being limited to the question of
the constitutionality of a statute requiring appointment of public officials from mem-
bers of political parties, which is the point on which Harrell is overruled. In Harrell,
the taxpayers laid a great deal of stress in their brief on the furnishing of memoranda
at public expense for private (major political party) purposes. See Annot., 140
A.L.R. 455, 459 (1942).
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States,8 it is submitted that this enactment falls within the prohibi-
tion of "special legislation."
I. THE REGISTRATION LAWS
The laws regarding registration, purging of voters who did not
vote or register, and re-registration of voters, are all a part of the
"machinery of election" or of conducting an election.'0 Nothing in
our constitutional system expressly sanctions legislative favoritism or
discrimination in the elective process based on political party affilia-
tion.11 Nonetheless, in Colorado, no person can lawfully be permit-
ted to vote at any primary, general or special election without first
having registered within the time and in the manner required by
statute.' This includes designating one's political affiliation. The
underlying purpose of the registration laws is the prevention of elec-
tion fraud.' 3
As a consequence of the new provisions of the Election Code,
the County Clerk would appear to be required by law to use tax-paid
personnel and the facilities of his office to provide the county chair-
men of the winning and runner-up political parties with a free list
of purged voters. This free service' 4 is given without provision for
8 Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328 (1900). See also Stewart v. Bacon County, 148 Ga.
105, 95 S.E. 983 (1918) ; People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 5 N.E. 596 (1886);
Coggeshell v. Des Moines, 138 Iowa 730, 117 N.W. 309 (1908); Pope v. Williams,
98 Md. 59, 56 Atl. 543 (1903), affd, 193 U.S. 621 (1904); Capen v. Foster, 29
Mass. (12 Pick) 485 (1832).
9 COLO. CoNsT. art. V, § 25. The statute may also violate the equal protection clause
of the Federal Constitution. Throughout the paper there will be references to that
clause and its application. The theory of invalidity under equal protection, is predicated
on an analysis quite similar to the one utilized in this paper; however, the special
legislation argument would seem to have more validity and less technical problems
associated with it. For instance, the questions of a) standing, b) jurisdiction, and c)
the giving of advisory opinions or declaratory judgments, present problems if a
"federal case" is made out. There would seem to be no problem that this is sufficient
-state action" and that the personal or political rights involved are appropriate to
raise a justiciable issue. As these questions are peripheral to our discussion, it has
been assumed that at least taxpaying purged electors of the minority parties would
have standing in a class action and that the Colorado Supreme Court would grant a
declaratory judgment.
1°Board of Registration Comm'rs v. Campbell, 251 Ky. 597, 65 S.W.2d 713 (1933)
(dictum).
" The heritage of a predominantly two-party system would seem to be, however, a
natural result of the "republican form" we are guaranteed. See generally BROGAN,
POLITICS AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, ch. 11 (1945). Brogan depicts the
so-called two-party system as not a truly national concept but states that it operates
in a regional fashion at best. In BROGAN, op. cit. supra at 47, it is further pointed out
that the framers may have attempted to provide against the two-party concept.
12 COLO. REV. STAT. § 49-4-1 (1963).
13 Board of Registration Comm'rs v. Campbell, 251 Ky. 597, 65 S.W.2d 713 (1933);
Simms v. County Ct. of Kanawha County, 134 W. Va. 867, 61 S.E.2d 849 '(1950).
Cf. § IV, B infra, of this Note, as to the more express purpose.
14 COLO. REV. STAT. § 49-4-21(3) (1963). There is no provision for a charge or fee.
It is assumed that none could be made by the clerk. Compare COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 49-4-23 (1963), authorizing receipt from the county of certain fees. See also COLO.




equal, or any, services to other political parties or unaffiliated, i.e.,
independent, electors.
II. THE FACTS
Among electors both purged and unpurged are those affiliated
with each of several political parties and others unaffiliated with
any political party. In 1960 the names of two "minor" political
parties, the Socialist-Labor and Socialist Workers, appeared on the
general election ballots.'" These two parties cast a total of 3,375
votes in Colorado, 6 1,618 votes in the City and County of Denver,' 7
582 votes in Pueblo County, 8 over 100 votes in four other counties,"9
and some votes in almost all of the counties.2" An independent can-
didate for the United States Senate in 1960 received 3,351 votes.2 '
In 1964, the Socialist-Labor, Socialist Workers and Prohibition par-
ties cast a total of 4,195 votes in Colorado, over 100 votes in nine
different counties,2 3 and some votes in all but five counties.2 4 The
"major political parties" in those years were the Republican and the
Democratic parties.
25
It would seem safe to assume that the electors voting Socialist-
Labor, Independent, et cetera, were also registered as other than
Democrat or Republican, and that the percentage purged from each
group would be approximately the same. It would then follow that,
although there has been no serious threat to the dominance of the two
major parties currently in power, there are substantial numbers of
electors whose rights stand to be infringed.
Since the burden of proof, through the presentation of adequate
facts, is on the one who attacks the constitutionality of registration
statutes,26 it would seem of paramount importance that some dis-
crepancy be shown between re-registration of members of the major








2Id. at 20 (1964).
23 ibid.
24 Ibid.
2 Ibid. Even more impressive was the New Hispano showing in the 1966 gubernatorial
race, in which they tallied 16,201 votes. STATE OF COLORADO, ABSTRACT OF VOTES
CAST 25 (1966). Elsewhere in the nation, it was found that in Norwalk, Connecticut,
in the 1947 and 1949 elections, the two major political parties were the Socialist
Party with the Republican Party in 1947 and with the Democratic Party in 1949. See
Mills v. Gaynor, 136 Conn. 632, 73 A.2d 823 (1950).
26 People v. Earl, 42 Colo. 238, 254, 94 Pac. 294, 299 (1908) (holding, inter alia,
that the registration statute attacked was not special legislation).
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and of the minor political parties (the latter taken to include inde-




Article V, Section 25 of the Constitution of Colorado provides:
The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in
any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say; for ... the
opening or conducting of any election .... granting to any corp-
oration, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege,
immunity or franchise whatever. In all other cases, where a general
law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.
As can be seen, Colorado adopted this section for the purpose
of prohibiting special legislation, privileges and favoritism where
general laws could be applied.
It is well settled that a law is not local or special when it is
general and uniform in its operation upon all in like situation, [so
the second question is] . . . whether or not the dassification pro-
vided by the acts under consideration is unreasonable....
'To make such a law general there must be some distinguishing
peculiarity which gives rise to a necessity for the law as to the desig-
nated class. A mere classification for the purpose of legislation with-
out regard to such necessity, is simply special legislation of the
most pernicious character, and is condemned by the constitution.'28
What "distinguishing peculiarity" gives rise to a necessity for a law
affording to the two major political parties the gratuity and favor of
a free list of purged voters?
IV. THE TESTS
A. Power
The legislature has authority, under its police power, 9 to enact
reasonable regulations for registration of electors only as long as
such regulations do not violate any provision of the constitution of
the state or of the United States.80 Basically, the tests for determining
the validity of the statutes in question under both the state and fed-
eral constitutional provisions, i.e., the "special legislation" and "equal
protection" clauses, respectively, are the same.81 This would seem to
2 The election commission records regarding purged and re-registered electors are not
broken down; in Denver, however, the information is on IBM cards and could be
grouped to reflect the statistics necessary.
28 People v. Earl, 42 Colo. 238, 264, 94 Pac. 294, 302-03 (1908), citing State v. Miller,
100 Mo. 439, 13 S.W. 677 (1890).
29 People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 5 N.E. 596 '(1886); People v. Ford Motor Co.,
271 App. Div. 141, 63 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1946).
30 Simmons v. Byrd, 192 Ind. 274, 136 N.E. 14 (1922) ; State v. Seibert, 228 Mo. App.
1133, 65 S.W.2d 129 (1933).
31 State Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931); Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H.
314, 197 Atl. 701 (1938); Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214




be true, despite the fact that the two provisions are the "antithesis"
of one another." That is, whereas one prevents discrimination in
enlarging the rights of citizens, the other prevents discrimination in
restricting their rights."8
B. The Purpose
The legislature's valid exercise of power is predicated on its
having a valid purpose in the first instance. The legislature's pur-
pose must be established before determining whether the classifica-
tion itself is reasonable. According to the cases, the underlying pur-
pose is the prevention of election fraud.8 4 It has been said that the
exercise of legislative power in this area is for the purpose of reg-
ulating, not qualifying, the exercise of the right of sufferage88
Apparently, in this instance, the purpose of the legislature was to
increase the number of voters of all persuasions exercising the elec-
tive franchise. Undoubtedly if the purpose had been to aid the major
political parties at the expense of the minor parties or minor party
and independent electors, the legislation would have been unconsti-
tutional from the outset.8 6
C. Determination of Reasonableness of the Classification
"In the matter of classification, the legislature has a wide range
of discretion. '83 Special legislation, or class legislation as it is some-
times called, violates constitutional prohibitions when the classifica-
tion used is arbitrary and capricious, 3 when it is not reasonable, 9
32 State v. Savage, 96 Ore. 53, 59, 184 Pac. 567, 570 (1919). Compare Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157
'(1912); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1901); American Sugar
Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900), to the effect that the Fourteenth
Amendment is not necessarily infringed by special legislation.
33Savage v. Martin, 161 Ore. 660, 684, 91 P.2d 273, 286-87 (1939). But see Rosen-
blum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 At. 701 (1938), to the effect that the equal
protection clause requires equality of benefit as well as equality of burden.
34 See note 13 supra.
3s Piuser v. Sioux City, 220 Iowa 308, 262 N.W. 551 (1935); Dysart v. St. Louis, 321
Mo. 514, 11 S.W.2d 1045 (1928) ; Simms v. County Ct. of Kanawha County, 134
W. Va. 867, 61 S.E.2d 849 (1950).
36 See note 7 supra. Compare Remsen v. Woolley, 22 N.J. Super. 459, 92 A.2d 87
(1952), with Harrell v. Sullivan, 220 Ind. 108, 40 N.E.2d 115 (1942), overruled
on other grounds, State v. Marion Cir. Ct., 225 Ind. 7, 72 N.E.2d 225 (1947).
37Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 338, 14 P,2d 1098, 1100 (1932),
citing Rifle Potato Growers Co-op. Ass'n v. Smith, 78 Colo. 171, 240 Pac. 937
(1925). See also cases cited at 16 AM. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law § 495 n. 20, at
862 (1964).
38 Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954) ; Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216
U.S. 400 (1910); Billings v. Illinois, 188 U.S. 97 (1903) ; Connolly v. Union Sewer
Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902) ; Cotting v. Godard, 183 U.S. 79 (1901) ; Gulf, Colo.
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897); State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 715, 731, 59 S.W. 1033, 1040 (1900).
39 New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1937), reh. denied,
304 U.S. 588 (1938) ; Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301
U.S. 459 (1937) ; Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S.
183 (1936).
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when it is unjust,4 ° when it does not have a rational basis,4 ' when it
is not based on a reasonable distinction in principle,42 when it is not
reasonably adopted to secure a legitimate public interest,4" or when
it reflects no material or substantial differences between the reg-
ulated and nonregulated classes." Also, when one class benefits,
there must be good reason for conferring a special privilege on that
class.45 Furthermore, the statute "must affect alike all persons in the
same class and under similar conditions.
46
If we assume the valid purpose of the legislation,47 the next
step is to determine whether the classification limiting the distribu-
tion of the purged voter list to the county chairmen of the two major
parties is reasonable, by the tests above. One reason for the legisla-
ture conferring a special privilege on the two major political parties
might have been the belief that other political parties would not
have a county chairman in each of the sixty-three counties. Also, the
legislature might have felt that the classification was reasonable
because this was the only way of getting any voters re-registered. It
is of record, however, that votes are cast in most of the counties by
these other political parties,48 so there would seem to be at least one
person to receive the information. And, in any event, the indepen-
dent voters are in no way represented by the classification. It is just
as arbitrary to distinguish Democrats and Republicans from New
Hispanos as it would be to distinguish red-headed and black-haired
men.49 Yet this is the net effect of the statute. Similarly, the other
tests (above) are not met. Thus, there would seem to be no reason,
in law or fact, to classify into "major" and "minor" political parties.
40 Consumers' League v. Colo. & So. Ry. Co., 53 Colo. 54, 125 Pac. 577 (1912).
41 Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
42 American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900).
4Woolfv. Fuller, 87 N.H. 64, 174 Ati. 193 (1934).
44 Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936) ; Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) ; State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S.
527 (1931). The Supreme Court of Colorado has held that:
to constitute class legislation within the constitutional prohibition, the classi-
fication must be unreasonable. The question of classification is primarily for
the legislature. Courts will not interfere with legislative classification unless
it appears that there is 'no fair reason for the law that would not equally
require its extension to the excepted class.'
Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 338, 14 P.2d 1098, 1100 (1932),
citing Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910) (emphasis added).
45 Champlin Refining Co. v. Cruse, 115 Colo. 329, 173 P.2d 213 (1946).
4 6 Zeigler v. People, 109 Colo. 252, 264, 124 P.2d 593, 598 (1942) ; accord, Champlin
Refining Co. v. Cruse, 115 Colo. 329, 173 P.2d 213 (1946).
47 The burden of proof is almost too heavy to meet on this point. An object (purpose)
would probably be held valid for an exercise of power if any set of facts could reason-
ably be conceived which would allow a finding of constitutionality. McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959)
Savage v. Martin, 161 Ore. 660, 91 P.2d 273 (1939).
48 See notes 15-25 supra.
49 Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369 (1916).
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Furnishing a free list of purged voters to the two major political
parties is a "sophisticated" mode of discrimination (in equal protec-
tion language) against all other political parties and individual
voters, but it would seem that the constitutional provision should
nullify "sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimi-
nation."50
D. Determination of the Reasonable Relation Between Classifica-
tion and Purpose
If there is no legislative power, then the reasonableness and
valid scientific basis of the classification are to no avail in upholding
the statute.5 ' Likewise, if the classification is improper, there can be
no reasonable relationship of that classification to any legitimate
ends of the legislation.1
2
A valid purpose and power have been stipulated above.13 Now
assume arguendo that a valid classification exists. The analysis is
still not complete, however, until a reasonable relationship is estab-
lished between the classification and the purpose. The classification
will not serve to achieve the legitimate ends sought unless it is also
assumed that the county chairmen are required, 54 by implication, to
to make an effort to re-register all electors purged.
E. Discrimination in Administration
The constitutionality of the statute before us must be tested in
its practical effects. The validity of a statute depends upon how it is
construed and applied. 5' Under the existing law, all purged voters
are not treated uniformly throughout the state in an effort to re-
register them.56 The extent of the effort made to re-register them is
delegated to the discretion of two major political party county chair-
men in each county. The natural objective of these chairmen is not
to get all purged voters re-registered, but rather it is to register only
those persons who vote for their own party. It is clearly unreasonable
to expect the Republican or Democratic county chairmen to exert as
50Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939). See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S- 356 (!886). See also Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
51 Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369 (1916).
52 Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
53 See text, § IV, B supra.
4 Note that county chairmen are not officials of the government nor strictly under
legislative, judicial or executive control. Cf. State v. Millspaugh, 241 Ind. 656, 175
N.E.2d 13 (1961) (judicial control).
55Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535 (1934) (equal protection case);
Mackay Tel. & Cable Co. v. Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94 (1919) ; Sunday Lake Iron Co.
v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 '(1918). In re Hunter, 97 Colo. 279, 49 P.2d 1009
(1935) (practical inequalities may be permitted).
56 For the uniformity requirement, see note 28 supra and accompanying text.
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much effort in getting registrations of Socialist-Laborites as they will
in procuring the registration of members of their own parties. Nor
will they make an equal, uniform and impartial effort to register all
purged voters in a spasm of patriotism to "get out the vote." Obvi-
ously a county chairman will use the furnished lists with selectivity
and partisan discrimination (in urging re-registration and in giving
assistance to the purged electors) in order to justify his own political
existence and to achieve the election of his own party candidates,
which (latter) function is his primary one.
V. OTHER POSSIBILITIES
If the Colorado law had provided that the County Clerk and
Recorder must mail notices to only those purged voters who were
registered as Democrats and Republicans or of any other class or
groups less than a whole group of purged voters, the unconstitution-
ality of such unreasonable special privileges would be clear. Likewise
it seems clear that a law furnishing a free list of purged voters to
the county chairmen of all political parties would violate the consti-
tutional rights of unaffiliated voters.
While courts have power to designate legislative schemes as
unlawful, they have no authority to prescribe how the legislature
should meet any particular problem or lawful objective." It is help-
ful in this study to keep in mind that the lawful objectives of
the legislature to obtain the registration of all purged voters (so
that they would not be dis-enfranchised at subsequent elections)
could have been accomplished in various constitutional ways. For
example, the legislature could have required the County Clerk within
ninety days after (or before, or both before and after) a general
election to mail notices to each purged voter at his last registered
address warning him or her that they were purged and must re-
register in order to be eligible to vote in any subsequent election.
Similarly, the legislature could have provided that the County
Clerk could cause copies of the registry list, or the purged list, or
both, to be printed in handbill form and copies made available to
any person for a specified fee.58 In Colorado, certain school districts
are already authorized to pay from one to two cents per name to the
5 7 Williams v. State, 85 Ark. 464, 108 S.W. 838 (1908), affd, 217 U.S. 79 (1910);
Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 14 P.2d 1098 (1932); Baird v.
Wichita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 Pac. 77 (1929).
58 This would be similar to the New Jersey practice. See Remsen v. Woolley, 22 N.J.
Super. 459, 92 A.2d 87 (1952). The New Jersey procedure is permissive with the
County Clerk as to whether or not such copies will be prepared at all. However,
preparation and availability could be made mandatory. The fee, if any, could be set
sufficient in amount to recoup some, if not all, of the cost preparation.
VOL. 44
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County Clerk and Recorder for registration lists used in their
elections.59
CONCLUSION
In summary, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1963, Section 49-4-21
(3) appears unconstitutional as follows:
A. A general law could have been made applicable without
giving an exclusive and special privilege to any political party.
B. The classification made is clearly unreasonable, partisan
and discriminatory.
C. The discrimination inherent in the law violates the require-
ment that there be a reasonable relationship between a legitimate end
sought to be achieved and the means utilized.
If by law, lists of purged voters are to be prepared by the County
Clerk and Recorder and furnished to anyone, they must be equally
available to everyone on the same basis, whether furnished free or
for a fee.
59 See COLO. REv. STAT. § 123-10-7 (1963).
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